ci: declare minimum permissions on PR title workflow#756
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Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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Declares
permissions: contents: read, pull-requests: readat the workflow level. The job's single step runs a PR-title validator (amannn/action-semantic-pull-requestor equivalent) which reads the PR title via the pulls API and reports the result as the workflow's own check status. That needs read onpull-requestsand nothing else.The reason to be explicit even when the inherited default may already be reasonable is CVE-2025-30066, the March 2025
tj-actions/changed-filescompromise where a tampered third-party action exfiltratedGITHUB_TOKENfrom workflow logs. The leaked token carried whatever scope was issued at the workflow level, so per-workflow caps bound the runtime blast radius regardless of repo or org default. The block also gives drift protection if that default ever widens and is what OpenSSF Scorecard's Token-Permissions check looks for.YAML validated locally with
yaml.safe_load.