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If the Unpacker is used repeatedly after an error occurs, the process may crash with a SEGV.
If the Unpacker is used repeatedly to unpack untrusted input from external sources, it may be vulnerable to a DoS attack.
Patches
v1.2.1
Workarounds
Users should create a new Unpacker instead of reusing the same Unpacker after an error occurs.
Applying the above patch can prevent SEGV, but reusing the Streaming Unpacker after it has encountered an error will not yield correct data. If an error occurs during Streaming Unpacking, the Stream and Streaming Unpacker should be discarded.
Therefore, this is not just a workaround but the correct solution. The above patch only prevents crashes from incorrect usage.
Affected range
<1.2.1
Fixed version
1.2.1
CVSS Score
7.5
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS Score
0.488%
EPSS Percentile
40th percentile
Description
MessagePack is the serializer implementation for Python msgpack.org. Prior to 1.2.1, there is an Out-of-bounds read/crash on Unpacker reuse after a caught error, potentially leading to a DoS attack. If the Unpacker is used repeatedly after an error occurs, the process may crash with a SEGV. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.1.
setuptools70.3.0 (pypi)
pkg:pypi/setuptools@70.3.0
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
A path traversal vulnerability in PackageIndex was fixed in setuptools version 78.1.1
Details
def _download_url(self, url, tmpdir):
# Determine download filename
#
name, _fragment = egg_info_for_url(url)
if name:
while '..' in name:
name = name.replace('..', '.').replace('\\', '_')
else:
name = "__downloaded__" # default if URL has no path contents
if name.endswith('.[egg.zip](http://egg.zip/)'):
name = name[:-4] # strip the extra .zip before download
--> filename = os.path.join(tmpdir, name)
os.path.join() discards the first argument tmpdir if the second begins with a slash or drive letter. name is derived from a URL without sufficient sanitization. While there is some attempt to sanitize by replacing instances of '..' with '.', it is insufficient.
Risk Assessment
As easy_install and package_index are deprecated, the exploitation surface is reduced.
However, it seems this could be exploited in a similar fashion like GHSA-r9hx-vwmv-q579, and as described by POC 4 in GHSA-cx63-2mw6-8hw5 report: via malicious URLs present on the pages of a package index.
Impact
An attacker would be allowed to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem with the permissions of the process running the Python code, which could escalate to RCE depending on the context.
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)defglobal_exclude(self, pattern):
match=translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFDreturnself._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
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