🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix authorization bypass in file deletion endpoint#156
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix authorization bypass in file deletion endpoint#156xb1g wants to merge 1 commit into
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…point Co-authored-by: xb1g <70068561+xb1g@users.noreply.github.com>
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Pull request overview
This PR fixes an authorization bypass (IDOR via path manipulation) in the DELETE /api/upload endpoint by tightening the ownership check from a substring match to a strict prefix match, ensuring a user can only delete objects stored under their own submissions/<userId>/... keyspace.
Changes:
- Replaced
fileName.includes(...)withfileName.startsWith(...)for strict ownership validation on delete. - Prevents crafted keys that merely contain
submissions/<userId>/from passing authorization.
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| Status | Name | Latest Commit | Updated (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|
| ❌ Deployment failed View logs |
web | bb14073 | May 11 2026, 06:27 PM |
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) via path manipulation in the
DELETE /api/uploadendpoint. The code usedfileName.includes(\submissions/${user.id}/`)to verify ownership, allowing an attacker to bypass authorization if their user ID appeared anywhere within a maliciously crafted file path. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could delete files belonging to other users if they correctly constructed a payload to bypass the.includescheck. 🔧 Fix: Changed.includesto.startsWithto strictly verify that the path begins with the authorized user's directory. ✅ Verification:pnpm testandpnpm lint` passed cleanly. Verified the logic mathematically guarantees strict prefix matching.PR created automatically by Jules for task 3678801344530333967 started by @xb1g