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Hello Team hope you guys doing well after furter investigation we found reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the /rss/tag/ endpoint of changedetection.io. The tag_uuid path parameter is reflected directly in the HTTP response body without HTML escaping. Since Flask returns text/html by default for plain string responses, the browser parses and executes injected JavaScript.
This vulnerability persists in version 0.54.1, which patched the related XSS in /rss/watch/ (CVE-2026-27645 / GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) but did not address the identical pattern in the tag RSS endpoint.
The tag_uuid parameter from the URL path is interpolated into the response body using an f-string with no escaping:
tag=datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('tags', {}).get(tag_uuid)
ifnottag:
returnf"Tag with UUID {tag_uuid} not found", 404# ← No escaping, Content-Type: text/html
Flask's default Content-Type for plain string responses is text/html; charset=utf-8, so any HTML/JavaScript injected via {tag_uuid} is rendered and executed by the browser.
CVE-2026-27645 (GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) addressed the identical vulnerability pattern in /rss/watch/ (single_watch.py). The fix applied in v0.54.1 patched that endpoint but did not fix the same pattern in /rss/tag/ (tag.py). Testing confirms:
/rss/watch/ on v0.54.1 — Returns generic 404 page, XSS no longer triggers ✅
/rss/tag/ on v0.54.1 — XSS payload still fires, vulnerability confirmed ❌
Attack Vector
The attack requires a valid RSS access token, which is a 32-character hex string exposed in the <link> HTML tag on the homepage without authentication:
Attacker visits the target's homepage (if unauthenticated) and extracts the RSS token from the <link> tag
Sends the link to a victim who has an active session on the changedetection.io instance
When the victim clicks the link, the server responds with:
Tag with UUID <img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)> not found
The browser renders the <img> tag, the onerror fires, and JavaScript executes in the victim's session context
Proof of Concept
Request
GET /rss/tag/%3Cimg%20src%3Dx%20onerror%3Dalert(document.domain)%3E?token=60b83b06df98b24c66367bc3d233105b HTTP/1.1Host: localhost:5000
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 NOT FOUNDContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8Tag with UUID <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> not found
The XSS payload is reflected unescaped in an HTML response. The browser executes alert(document.domain) and displays "localhost", confirming JavaScript execution.
Tested on: changedetection.io v0.54.1 (Docker, localhost, Feb 25, 2026)
bandicam.2026-02-25.09-22-09-917.mp4
Impact
Session cookie theft via document.cookie exfiltration
Account takeover if session cookies lack the HttpOnly flag
Phishing via crafted links that appear to originate from a trusted changedetection.io instance
Low exploitation barrier - the RSS token is obtainable without authentication from the homepage <link> tag
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
Learn more on MITRE.
Hello Team hope you guys doing well after furter investigation we found reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the
/rss/tag/endpoint of changedetection.io. Thetag_uuidpath parameter is reflected directly in the HTTP response body without HTML escaping. Since Flask returnstext/htmlby default for plain string responses, the browser parses and executes injected JavaScript.This vulnerability persists in version 0.54.1, which patched the related XSS in
/rss/watch/(CVE-2026-27645 / GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) but did not address the identical pattern in the tag RSS endpoint.Package
Severity
Moderate - CVSS 6.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NDetails
File:
changedetectionio/blueprint/rss/tag.pyLine: 36 Source: tag.py @ 1d72716The
tag_uuidparameter from the URL path is interpolated into the response body using an f-string with no escaping:Flask's default
Content-Typefor plain string responses istext/html; charset=utf-8, so any HTML/JavaScript injected via{tag_uuid}is rendered and executed by the browser.Relationship to CVE-2026-27645
CVE-2026-27645 (GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) addressed the identical vulnerability pattern in
/rss/watch/(single_watch.py). The fix applied in v0.54.1 patched that endpoint but did not fix the same pattern in/rss/tag/(tag.py). Testing confirms:/rss/watch/on v0.54.1 — Returns generic 404 page, XSS no longer triggers ✅/rss/tag/on v0.54.1 — XSS payload still fires, vulnerability confirmed ❌Attack Vector
The attack requires a valid RSS access token, which is a 32-character hex string exposed in the
<link>HTML tag on the homepage without authentication:Attacker visits the target's homepage (if unauthenticated) and extracts the RSS token from the
<link>tagCrafts a malicious URL:
Sends the link to a victim who has an active session on the changedetection.io instance
When the victim clicks the link, the server responds with:
The browser renders the
<img>tag, theonerrorfires, and JavaScript executes in the victim's session contextProof of Concept
Request
Response
The XSS payload is reflected unescaped in an HTML response. The browser executes
alert(document.domain)and displays "localhost", confirming JavaScript execution.Tested on: changedetection.io v0.54.1 (Docker, localhost, Feb 25, 2026)
bandicam.2026-02-25.09-22-09-917.mp4
Impact
document.cookieexfiltrationHttpOnlyflag<link>tagSuggested Fix
Escape the
tag_uuidparameter before reflecting it in the response, or set theContent-Typetotext/plain:Option A: HTML Escape (Recommended)
Option B: Set Content-Type to text/plain
Credits
References