Remove Copilot Yolo-off compatibility restriction (#849)

Copilot ACP now handles Yolo-off permission requests correctly. Remove the Copilot-specific prompt restriction so Yolo-off sessions use the standard permission flow.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Author: DinahK-2SO

doc/specs/Yolo-mode.md

@@ -166,20 +166,6 @@ through its normal interactive permission behavior. A failed disable or an
 unknown remote outcome retains fail-closed state until the Agent CLI stack is
 replaced.
 
-GitHub Copilot CLI versions beginning with `1.0.81-1` have an upstream ACP
-regression that can report `allow_all=off` while executing tools without
-`session/request_permission`
-([github/copilot-cli#4537](https://github.com/github/copilot-cli/issues/4537)).
-The helper records the master-attested Copilot version and blocks every prompt
-producer when that exact session has acknowledged `allow_all=off` for the
-open-ended affected range. This includes a manual `/config` selection that
-differs from the global default. A missing or unsupported capability retains
-the provider's normal interactive path. Versions `1.0.81-0` and earlier retain
-the normal permission path. A session that acknowledges `allow_all=on` still
-permits prompts because the user selected the provider's unattended mode. A
-future version must pass the live denied-permission probe before the affected
-range is bounded.
-
 Operations are serialized per session and fenced by lifecycle generation. A
 newer desired operation supersedes an older one; stale completions cannot
 commit state for a replaced or reused session ID.
@@ -217,7 +203,7 @@ option is not sufficient.
 
 | Provider | Advertised contract | Enable | Restore |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| GitHub Copilot | `configOptions` ID `allow_all`, category `permissions`, Select values `on`/`off`; provider command `/allow_all` | `session/set_config_option(allow_all, on)` or the policy-gated provider command | Captured value, normally `off`; affected CLI versions are prompt-blocked because `off` is not trustworthy |
+| GitHub Copilot | `configOptions` ID `allow_all`, category `permissions`, Select values `on`/`off`; provider command `/allow_all` | `session/set_config_option(allow_all, on)` or the policy-gated provider command | Captured value, normally `off` |
 | Claude | `configOptions` ID `mode` with `bypassPermissions`; legacy mode fallback | `session/set_config_option(mode, bypassPermissions)` | Captured value, normally `default` |
 | Codex | `configOptions` ID `mode` with `agent-full-access`; legacy mode fallback | `session/set_config_option(mode, agent-full-access)` | Captured value, normally `agent` |
 | Gemini | ACP mode `yolo` | `session/set_mode(yolo)` | Captured mode, normally `default` |
@@ -263,9 +249,6 @@ defense in depth, not authorization. See `doc/security-model.md`.
   ACP session capability is implemented.
 - Gemini has no per-session WTA control because its current adapter advertises
   a mode but no corresponding config option.
-- Copilot CLI `1.0.81-1` and later block prompts whenever the exact session
-  acknowledges `allow_all=off`, until the upstream ACP permission regression
-  is fixed and a release passes the denied-permission probe.
 - Provider mode semantics and managed restrictions remain provider-owned.
 - WTA does not continuously poll for changes made by another actor; the next
   config update, reconciliation, or replacement session refreshes state.

tools/wta/src/protocol/acp/client.rs

@@ -3154,13 +3154,9 @@ pub async fn run_acp_client_over_pipe(
             .context("initialize over master pipe failed")
         })?;
     let wta_meta = crate::session_registry::extract_wta_meta(&mut init_resp.meta);
-    state.native_yolo.set_resolved_agent(
-        wta_meta.resolved_agent_id.as_deref(),
-        init_resp
-            .agent_info
-            .as_ref()
-            .map(|info| info.version.as_str()),
-    );
+    state
+        .native_yolo
+        .set_resolved_agent_id(wta_meta.resolved_agent_id.as_deref());
     let cloud_catalog = crate::protocol::acp::model_select::cloud_catalog_from_wta_meta(&wta_meta);
     if matches!(&agent_source, crate::agent_source::AgentSource::Host)
         && !cloud_catalog.models.is_empty()
@@ -5519,29 +5515,6 @@ async fn dispatch_prompt_body(
         return;
     }
 
-    if let Some(error) = client_task
-        .state
-        .native_yolo
-        .disabled_prompt_block_reason(&prompt_session_id)
-    {
-        tracing::error!(
-            target: "yolo",
-            session_id = %prompt_session_id_str,
-            error = %error,
-            "blocking prompt because the provider cannot attest disabled permissions"
-        );
-        let message = provider_permission_contract_blocked(&error);
-        let _ = event_tx_task.send(AppEvent::AgentError {
-            session_id: Some(prompt_session_id_str),
-            failure: AgentFailure::Protocol {
-                code: -32003,
-                message: message.clone(),
-            },
-            message,
-        });
-        return;
-    }
-
     if client_task
         .state
         .yolo_state
@@ -5712,14 +5685,7 @@ async fn dispatch_prompt_body(
                 {
                     Some((provider_disable_pending(), "yolo_disable_pending"))
                 } else {
-                    native_yolo
-                        .disabled_prompt_block_reason(&guard_session_id)
-                        .map(|error| {
-                            (
-                                provider_permission_contract_blocked(&error),
-                                "permission_contract_blocked",
-                            )
-                        })
+                    None
                 };
                 let should_send = !provider_command_blocked && yolo_safety_error.is_none();
                 if let Some(error) = yolo_safety_error {