diff --git a/.last-modified/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml b/.last-modified/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml index f6e6e7997..5a6d3e25a 100644 --- a/.last-modified/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml +++ b/.last-modified/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -2025-08-19T10:13:21Z +2026-05-14T18:02:32Z diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml index 2be150b93..12813f2f1 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v29p1.xml @@ -9536,7 +9536,7 @@ >Rusk and McNamara decided not to approach the President on the question at this time. At that meeting Bundy, Forrestal, and Bundy, Forrestal, and Komer discussed the problem and agreed that “some action on force levels in Korea” should be taken, that U.S. and Korean forces should not be reduced simultaneously, @@ -10533,7 +10533,7 @@ 7. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. I. Secret. @@ -10578,7 +10578,7 @@ 8. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. I. Secret. @@ -10719,10 +10719,11 @@ not right to address this issue, the President agreed to postpone the requested study until an unspecified future date. (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to - Bundy, June 6; ibid., National Security - Action Memoranda, NSAM 298) Since a draft report had already been - prepared, Bundy suggested it be circulated. - (Memorandum from Bundy to Bundy, June 6; ibid., + National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 298) Since a draft report + had already been prepared, Bundy suggested it be circulated. (Memorandum from + Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, June 9; ibid., Files of Robert W. Komer, Korea, @@ -10874,7 +10875,7 @@ 12. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. I. Secret. @@ -10896,13 +10897,14 @@ people, the populace led by the students would topple Park Chong Hui’s Government within a matter of weeks.” (Memorandum from Green to Bundy, June 1; - National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files - 1964–66, POL 15 KOR S) Pak will probably impose - martial law, which we oppose. We fear it will only bottle up popular - resentment, which will burst out even more violently sometime later. - [4 lines of source text not declassified]

+ >Green to Bundy, June 1; National Archives and Records + Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 KOR S) Pak will probably impose martial law, which + we oppose. We fear it will only bottle up popular resentment, which will + burst out even more violently sometime later. [4 lines + of source text not declassified]

We’re worried lest we be over-identified with yet another repressive campaign by one of our Asian clients. This may also spell the end of ROK-Jap settlement hopes this @@ -11545,8 +11547,8 @@ study written in reply to NSAM 298, noting that the drafts had not been approved by Rusk or McNamara. (Memorandum - from Johnson to - Bundy, June 12; ibid.) + from Johnson to Bundy, June 12; ibid.) Washington, S-US. Confidential; Official-Informal. At the top of this document - Bundy added a handwritten notation to - Green: “MG—for your use. I - gather Bob [Fearey] hopes to - pull this together. WPB.” + Bundy added a handwritten + notation to Green: “MG—for + your use. I gather Bob [Fearey] hopes to pull this together. WPB.” Seoul, , who received a copy for review and comment, raised two objections to JCS recommendations 5 and 6 - of this memorandum. Bundy believed - CINCUNC and the Ambassador should retain authority to - release ROK troops - without channeling the request through the Bundy believed CINCUNC and the + Ambassador should retain authority to release ROK troops without + channeling the request through the JCS, and he noted that, since Korea had its own refinery, a suspension of POL would be ineffective as a means to exert pressure on the ROK Government in the event of a crisis. - (Letter from Bundy to Solbert, - November 20; Washington National Records Center, RG - 330,OSD/OASD/Bundy to Solbert, November 20; + Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 381 Korea) McNamara, the Department of State, and @@ -12578,11 +12583,11 @@ frus:doc-dateTime-min="1964-01-03T00:00:00-05:00" n="24" subtype="editorial-note" type="document" xml:id="d24"> 24. Editorial Note -

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs - Bundy visited Seoul October 1–3, 1964. During - his visit he held individual meetings with Minister of Foreign Affairs - Yi, Deputy Prime Minister and - Minister of the Economic Planning Board Chang, +

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Bundy visited Seoul October 1–3, 1964. + During his visit he held individual meetings with Minister of Foreign + Affairs Yi, Deputy Prime Minister + and Minister of the Economic Planning Board Chang, Prime Minister Chong, President Pak, and Minister of National Defense Kim. The discussions focused primarily on relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, but participants also exchanged @@ -13381,14 +13386,15 @@ settlement, North Korea, the pending Status of Forces Agreement, economic matters, and similar issues. On March 16 the Foreign Minister met separately with Vice President Humphrey, Assistant Secretary of - State for Far Eastern Affairs Bundy, and Secretary - of Defense McNamara, with whom - many of the same issues were discussed, particularly Vietnam and the - settlement with Japan. Before leaving Washington, the Foreign Minister - also met briefly with President Johnson to exchange greetings and accept the President’s - thanks for Korea’s support in Vietnam and his congratulations on the - progress made thus far toward reaching an agreement with Japan.

+ State for Far Eastern Affairs Bundy, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, with whom many of the same + issues were discussed, particularly Vietnam and the settlement with + Japan. Before leaving Washington, the Foreign Minister also met briefly + with President Johnson to + exchange greetings and accept the President’s thanks for Korea’s support + in Vietnam and his congratulations on the progress made thus far toward + reaching an agreement with Japan.

Documentation covering the Foreign Minister’s visit is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, Seoul, April 15, 1965. -

1008. For Bundy. Ref: Deptel 982.In telegram 982 to - Seoul, April 14, the Department of State acknowledged the political - difficulties arising from the troop issue in Korea and stated the - “urgent need for introduction of additional Korean, Australian and - New Zealand troops in SVN.” The - Department wanted the ROK to furnish - a 3,000-man regimental combat team, with the probable future - requirement of one division. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) +

1008. For Bundy. Ref: Deptel 982.In telegram 982 to Seoul, April 14, the Department of State + acknowledged the political difficulties arising from the troop issue + in Korea and stated the “urgent need for introduction of additional + Korean, Australian and New Zealand troops in SVN.” The Department wanted the ROK to furnish a 3,000-man regimental combat team, with + the probable future requirement of one division. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) ROK Troops for Vietnam.

Following telegram was on point of despatch when reftel received. It is nevertheless transmitted in order to stress importance in Korea of @@ -14149,8 +14156,9 @@ Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared - by Hilliker, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to + >Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Hilliker, and approved by + Bundy. Repeated to Saigon. @@ -14874,10 +14882,10 @@ subtype="historical-document" type="document" xml:id="d44"> 44. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff and the President’s Special - Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Park Visit Briefing Book. Secret. @@ -14950,8 +14958,8 @@ Korea. It provided for a 70-day period of compulsory arbitration before workers actually went on strike, denied certain categories of workers the right to strike, and limited the right to strike in - times of emergency. (Ibid.) For Bundy - from Ambassador.

+ times of emergency. (Ibid.) For Bundy from Ambassador.

The long and painful chapter of Seoul, June 14, 1965. -

1309. For Bundy and Johnson from Ambassador. Subj: ROK troops to Vietnam.

+

1309. For Bundy and Johnson from Ambassador. Subj: ROK troops to Vietnam.

President Park has just told me that For - Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador. - Subj:ROK Deployment Bundy from + Ambassador. Subj:ROK Deployment RVN-MAP Transfer and Pay Raise.

@@ -17156,13 +17164,13 @@ 60. Editorial Note

Korean Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won visited Washington November 29–December 1, 1965. On November 29 the - Foreign Minister met with Assistant Secretary of State - Bundy for discussions covering the treaty with - Japan, the Korean item and Chinese representation in the United Nations, - Korean procurement for and the situation in Vietnam, and Korean fishing - interests. Many of those topics were also discussed between Foreign - Minister Yi and Secretary - Rusk later that day. The + Foreign Minister met with Assistant Secretary of State Bundy for discussions covering the + treaty with Japan, the Korean item and Chinese representation in the + United Nations, Korean procurement for and the situation in Vietnam, and + Korean fishing interests. Many of those topics were also discussed + between Foreign Minister Yi and + Secretary Rusk later that day. The Foreign Minister also met with Vice President Humphrey and Secretary McNamara during the visit. The major topic discussed at those meetings was Vietnam.

@@ -17187,8 +17195,9 @@ xml:id="d61fn1">Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy and - approved in S/S on December 8. + >Exdis. Drafted by Bundy and approved in S/S on December 8. Washington, Seoul, December 16, 1965, 0930Z. -

598. For Bundy, FE. Subject: Further Korean Troops - to Vietnam.

+

598. For Bundy, FE. Subject: + Further Korean Troops to Vietnam.

This afternoon I called on President Park and gave him a full @@ -19587,9 +19596,10 @@ frus:doc-dateTime-min="1966-02-03T18:25:00-05:00" n="78" subtype="historical-document" type="document" xml:id="d78"> 78. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National - Security Affairs (Bundy) to President - JohnsonSource: Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III. Secret. @@ -19646,8 +19656,8 @@

Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to the President’s Special - Assistant for National Security Affairs - (Bundy) + Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

SUBJECT @@ -20287,14 +20297,14 @@ Seoul, April 26, 1966, 1010Z. -

1214. For the Secretary and Assistant Secretary - Bundy from Ambassador. SOFA. Ref: A. Deptel - 1118.The Joint State-Defense message - transmitted in telegram 1118 to Seoul, April 22, informed the - Embassy that the criminal-jurisdiction article in the SOFA with Korea could not be modified - and set forth the reasons on which that decision was based. +

1214. For the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador. SOFA. Ref: A. Deptel 1118.The Joint + State-Defense message transmitted in telegram 1118 to Seoul, April + 22, informed the Embassy that the criminal-jurisdiction article in + the SOFA with Korea could not be + modified and set forth the reasons on which that decision was based. (Ibid.) B. Embtels 1200 and 1201.In telegrams 1200 and 1201, both April 23, the Embassy argued for reopening the SOFA negotiations to @@ -20475,22 +20485,23 @@ 1966. SUBJECT - Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with Mr. - Colby, June 16, 1966Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with + Mr. Colby, June 16, 1966Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS - Mr. Bundy for FE; Messrs. Colby, Smith, [names - not declassified] for CIA; - Mr. Jorden for WH; Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC; and Messrs. Trueheart, Slutz, - Cuthell, and Fleck of FE for - their respective areas + Mr. Bundy for FE; Messrs. + Colby, Smith, [names not declassified] for CIA; Mr. Jorden + for WH; Mr. + Stuart for INR/DDC; and Messrs. Trueheart, Slutz, Cuthell, and + Fleck of FE for their + respective areas

[Here follows discussion of Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore.]

@@ -20532,24 +20543,25 @@ Korea. These groups had been further subdivided into teams of three or four men who were heavily armed and were to be infiltrated into South Korea, some by land, others by sea.

-

In response to inquiries by Mr. Bundy, [In response to inquiries by Mr. Bundy, [less than 1 line of source + text not declassified] said that [less than 1 + line of source text not declassified] Kim Chong-p’il whom [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] still + regarded as a possible “comer” in Korean politics. [1 + line of source text not declassified]. Kim continued his + scheming and it was clear that if the president made too many mistakes + Kim would “get him.” Asked if this was a short term prospect, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified] Kim - Chong-p’il whom [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified] still regarded as a possible - “comer” in Korean politics. [1 line of source text not - declassified]. Kim continued his scheming and it was clear that - if the president made too many mistakes Kim would “get him.” Asked if - this was a short term prospect, [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified] said that [less - than 1 line of source text not declassified] thought not, that - Kim was continuing to bide his time while developing a political - following.Periodic reports submitted by - the Embassy on Kim - Chong-pil’s activities since returning to Korea in - December 1964 are ibid., POL 12 KOR - S and POL 15–1 KOR S. + declassified] thought not, that Kim was continuing to bide his + time while developing a political following.Periodic reports submitted by the Embassy on Kim Chong-pil’s activities since + returning to Korea in December 1964 are ibid., POL 12 KOR S and POL 15–1 KOR S.

Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)Source: - Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, - East Asia General. Secret. The letter indicates that - Bundy saw the document and had a copy of it - sent to Rusk, Katzenbach, Rostow, Kohler, and Harriman. + Department of State, Bundy + Files: Lot 85 D 240, East Asia General. Secret. The letter indicates + that Bundy saw the document + and had a copy of it sent to Rusk, Katzenbach, Rostow, Kohler, and Harriman. Seoul, POL 7 US/JOHNSON. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to - Manila Eyes Only for Secretary and Bundy and - passed to the White House. + Manila Eyes Only for Secretary and Bundy and passed to the White House. Seoul, POL 32–4 KOR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok for the Secretary and - Bundy and USUN. + Bundy and USUN. Seoul, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1283–1296.

Secretary of State Rusk and - Assistant Secretary of State Bundy also accompanied - President Johnson to Korea. - Secretary Rusk held an unrecorded - discussion with the Korean Prime Minister during a Presidential - reception on November 1. The Prime Minister later mentioned to - Ambassador Brown that he had - discussed the possibility of using Korean veterans in Vietnam with - Secretary Rusk. Assistant - Secretary Bundy met with President Pak’s Protocol + Assistant Secretary of State Bundy also accompanied President Johnson to Korea. Secretary Rusk held an unrecorded discussion with + the Korean Prime Minister during a Presidential reception on November 1. + The Prime Minister later mentioned to Ambassador Brown that he had discussed the + possibility of using Korean veterans in Vietnam with Secretary Rusk. Assistant Secretary Bundy met with President Pak’s Protocol Secretary on November 2. (Telegram 2534 from Seoul, November 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,POL 7 US/JOHNSON)

-

Assistant Secretary Bundy also spoke with the - Foreign Minister, who discussed the Korean items in the United Nations - and indicated that the “ROK is strongly - opposed to any invitation to North Koreans” and “would prefer even - significant loss of votes on the items to any change in present - tactics.” The Foreign Minister “cornered” Assistant Secretary - Bundy during the departure ceremonies at the - Seoul airport to give him a memorandum discussing the Korean view of the - U.S. approach to the Korean items at the United Nations. (Telegrams 3346 - and 3348 from Bundy in Tokyo, both November 4; both +

Assistant Secretary Bundy also + spoke with the Foreign Minister, who discussed the Korean items in the + United Nations and indicated that the “ROK is strongly opposed to any invitation to North Koreans” + and “would prefer even significant loss of votes on the items to any + change in present tactics.” The Foreign Minister “cornered” Assistant + Secretary Bundy during the + departure ceremonies at the Seoul airport to give him a memorandum + discussing the Korean view of the U.S. approach to the Korean items at + the United Nations. (Telegrams 3346 and 3348 from Bundy in Tokyo, both November 4; both ibid., POL 7 US/BUNDY) To strengthen confidence that the United States continued its unequivocal support for Korea at the United @@ -22431,7 +22446,7 @@ >DOD), cleared by General Brown (JCS), and by Shostal (S/S), and approved by - Bundy. + Bundy. Washington, . SUBJECT - Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with Mr. - Colby, December 1, 1966Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with + Mr. Colby, December 1, 1966Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS - Messrs. Bundy, Berger, Unger and Lakeland for EA; Messrs. Colby and Messrs. Bundy, Berger, Unger and Lakeland for + EA; Messrs. Colby and Smith for CIA; Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC; Mr. Colby said he was not fully persuaded of the - correctness of this analysis; Mr. Bundy agreed that - the situation did not appear to have developed to a point warranting - these judgments. Mr. Bundy went on to say that - General Bonesteel had - vigorously argued for the conclusion that the North Koreans had adopted - a new aggressive policy. The General also called for some retaliatory - action to protect his troops. One could sympathize with the General, but - here again Mr. Bundy did not find himself in - agreement. Mr. Bundy said, however, that he thought - perhaps the General was right in believing that the North Koreans were attacking and trying to - infiltrate South Korea in order to do what they could to disrupt the - April elections. The opposition in South Korea had been claiming for - some time that South Korean strength was not sufficient to protect the - country. The North Korean strategy appeared to be tailored to aid the - opposition.

+ correctness of this analysis; Mr. Bundy agreed that the situation did not appear to have + developed to a point warranting these judgments. Mr. Bundy went on to say that General + Bonesteel had vigorously + argued for the conclusion that the North Koreans had adopted a new + aggressive policy. The General also called for some retaliatory action + to protect his troops. One could sympathize with the General, but here + again Mr. Bundy did not find + himself in agreement. Mr. Bundy + said, however, that he thought perhaps the General was right in + believing that the North + Koreans were attacking and trying to infiltrate South Korea in order to + do what they could to disrupt the April elections. The opposition in + South Korea had been claiming for some time that South Korean strength + was not sufficient to protect the country. The North Korean strategy + appeared to be tailored to aid the opposition.

[Here follows discussion of China, Vietnam, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines.]

@@ -23187,16 +23203,16 @@ quality mix in terms of specialties is such as to fill some of our more glaring present deficiencies, we should be in reasonably good shape. We have little hope of getting a good mix, however.In a second letter to Bundy, - December 13, continuing discussion of U.S. Army strength. Brown stated that “one of our main - problems here was that even when we had enough bodies we did not - have people with the right qualifications and experience. The - result, therefore, is that the combat effectiveness of the forces is - far less than would appear from their numerical strength.” Brown attached an in-depth study of - the problem done by Bonesteel. (National Archives and Records - Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 KOR + xml:id="d105fn3">In a second letter to Bundy, December 13, continuing discussion of U.S. + Army strength. Brown stated + that “one of our main problems here was that even when we had enough + bodies we did not have people with the right qualifications and + experience. The result, therefore, is that the combat effectiveness + of the forces is far less than would appear from their numerical + strength.” Brown attached an + in-depth study of the problem done by Bonesteel. (National Archives + and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 KOR S–US)

@@ -23476,8 +23492,8 @@

Exclusive for Ambassador and info General Bonesteel—eyes only—from - Bundy and McNaughton.

+ Bundy and McNaughton.

Refs: A. Seoul’s 2756. B. Seoul’s 2760. C. State 88135. Document 101; Seoul, June 7, 1967, 0841Z. -

6635. For Secretary and Bundy from Ambassador. - Subject: Tactics and Considerations on Any New Request for Further - Troops for Vietnam.

+

6635. For Secretary and Bundy from + Ambassador. Subject: Tactics and Considerations on Any New Request for + Further Troops for Vietnam.

Before leaving this post, @@ -24725,19 +24741,20 @@ problems which he personally will face, and I think would be the approach best calculated to put him in a responsive frame of mind. - Bundy instructed the Vice President to - follow Brown’s suggested - approach during his talks with Pak when attending the - President’s inauguration in Seoul. (Telegram 217692, TOVIP 2, to - Seoul, June 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG - 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL - 27–3 VIET S) Humphrey discussed - the matter with Pak during a meeting on June 30 and broached the - subject again during a farewell call on July 3. (Telegram 23 - from Seoul, July 1; ibid.,POL 7 - US/HUMPHREY; and telegram 72 from Seoul, July 5; ibid., Bundy instructed the Vice + President to follow Brown’s suggested approach during his talks with Pak + when attending the President’s inauguration in Seoul. (Telegram + 217692, TOVIP 2, to Seoul, June 28; National Archives and + Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S) + >S) Humphrey discussed the matter with Pak during a + meeting on June 30 and broached the subject again during a + farewell call on July 3. (Telegram 23 from Seoul, July 1; + ibid.,POL 7 US/HUMPHREY; and + telegram 72 from Seoul, July 5; ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S) President Pak’s personal attitude is, of course, the most crucial @@ -24864,22 +24881,23 @@ 1967. SUBJECT - Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with Mr. - Colby, June 22, 1967Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with + Mr. Colby, June 22, 1967Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS - Messrs. Bundy, Berger, Habib, and Burke for EA; - Messrs. Colby, Smith and - Hickox for CIA; Mr. - Stuart for INR/DDC and Mr. Bean of EA for the Singapore item + Messrs. Bundy, Berger, Habib, and Burke for EA; Messrs. Colby, Smith and Hickox for CIA; Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC and Mr. + Bean of EA + for the Singapore item

[Here follows a discussion of Singapore.]

Korea

@@ -25733,8 +25751,8 @@ Assembly,” for the political opposition had already indicated it would resist sending additional combat troops to Vietnam. (Memorandum of conversation, July 27, attached to a letter from - Newman to Bundy, July 28; ibid.,POL 7 US) + Newman to Bundy, July 28; + ibid.,POL 7 US) @@ -25751,11 +25769,12 @@ Newman, the Prime Minister suggested that the question of additional troops would best be handled between President Johnson and President - Pak. In his subsequent letter Newman urged - Bundy “to give serious thought to the - use of this tactic if and when we have to ask for additional - Korean troop contribution. I become more convinced that at the - right time this can be the key to success.” (Ibid.) + Pak. In his subsequent letter Newman urged Bundy “to give serious thought + to the use of this tactic if and when we have to ask for + additional Korean troop contribution. I become more convinced + that at the right time this can be the key to success.” + (Ibid.) @@ -25806,18 +25825,18 @@ Seoul, August 23, 1967, 0945Z. -

912. For Bundy and Berger from Porter. Subj: ROK Internal Security. Ref: Seoul 818.Telegram 818 from Seoul, August 18, contains - a Country Team message outlining the threat North Korea posed to the - ROK and the latter’s attempts to - counter it. The message concluded that North Korea’s goal was “to - destroy public confidence in ROK, - force withdrawal U.S. forces and unify Korea on Communist terms.” It - noted that North Korean subversive activities had increased to - unanticipated levels and could only be expected to escalate, with - large-scale operations expected in the spring of 1968. - (Ibid.) +

912. For Bundy and Berger from + Porter. Subj: ROK Internal Security. + Ref: Seoul 818.Telegram 818 from Seoul, + August 18, contains a Country Team message outlining the threat + North Korea posed to the ROK and the + latter’s attempts to counter it. The message concluded that North + Korea’s goal was “to destroy public confidence in ROK, force withdrawal U.S. forces and + unify Korea on Communist terms.” It noted that North Korean + subversive activities had increased to unanticipated levels and + could only be expected to escalate, with large-scale operations + expected in the spring of 1968. (Ibid.)

@@ -25886,13 +25905,13 @@ of my deep concern over the importance of speedily providing the weapons and ammo the ROKG wants and needs for the police.At a meeting - attended by Bundy, Berger, [text - not declassified] on August 31, it was reported that - the requested weapons had been obtained and would be delivered - to the Korean police as soon as the Koreans paid for them. - (Memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes, Denney, and Evans, - September 1; Department of State, Bundy, + Berger, [text not declassified] on August 31, it + was reported that the requested weapons had been obtained and + would be delivered to the Korean police as soon as the Koreans + paid for them. (Memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes, Denney, and + Evans, September 1; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, 1967) To have ill-equipped police @@ -25937,24 +25956,25 @@ severely prejudiced and possibly imperiled. We must do what is necessary now to help Pak if we are to succeed in achieving our other objectives.In telegram 27837 to - Seoul, August 26, Bundy expressed his full - agreement with Porter’s and the Country Team’s recommendations - and stated that the matters were being given priority attention. - (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central - Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR - S) Also in late August the - Embassy, Department of State, and UN Mission decided to prepare a White Paper - documenting North Korean violations of the DMZ for presentation to the General - Assembly. Documentation on the UN - presentation is ibid., POL 23–7 - KOR S, POL 23–7 KOR S/UN, and POL 27–14 KOR/UN. - The report submitted to the United Nations on November 2 is in - American Foreign Policy: Current - Documents, 1967, pp. 788–790. + Seoul, August 26, Bundy + expressed his full agreement with Porter’s and the Country + Team’s recommendations and stated that the matters were being + given priority attention. (National Archives and Records + Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR S) Also in late August the Embassy, Department of + State, and UN Mission decided to + prepare a White Paper documenting North Korean violations of the + DMZ for presentation to the + General Assembly. Documentation on the UN presentation is ibid., POL 23–7 KOR S, + POL 23–7 KOR S/UN, and + POL 27–14 KOR/UN. The report submitted to the + United Nations on November 2 is in American + Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. + 788–790. @@ -26015,16 +26035,16 @@ 15, 1967. SUBJECT - Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with Mr. - Colby, September 15, 1967Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with + Mr. Colby, September 15, 1967Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS - Messrs. Bundy and Burke for EA; Messrs. Colby, Messrs. Bundy and Burke for + EA; Messrs. Colby, Smith [name not declassified] for CIA; Mr. Stuart for CINCPAC. From Ambassador. Subj: Additional ROK Forces for Vietnam. Ref: State 37911.In telegram 37911 to Seoul, - September 15, Bundy asked Porter to provide information - concerning the request for additional ROK troops for Vietnam. (Ibid.) + September 15, Bundy asked + Porter to provide + information concerning the request for additional ROK troops for Vietnam. (Ibid.)

@@ -26508,14 +26528,14 @@ target="#t_ROK1">ROK discuss with UNC means of making North Korean actions more costly for NK elements as they occur.” (Telegram 1483 from Seoul, - September 22; ibid.) Bundy concurred with - Porter’s recommendation - and stated that the matter was being given “urgent attention” in - Washington. (Telegram 45165 to Seoul, September 28; ibid.) On - October 11 Porter discussed - his approach with Pak, who was receptive to meeting North Korean - actions as they occurred. (Telegram 1797 from Seoul, October 11; - ibid.) + September 22; ibid.) Bundy + concurred with Porter’s + recommendation and stated that the matter was being given “urgent + attention” in Washington. (Telegram 45165 to Seoul, September 28; + ibid.) On October 11 Porter + discussed his approach with Pak, who was receptive to meeting North + Korean actions as they occurred. (Telegram 1797 from Seoul, October + 11; ibid.)

131. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian - and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the - Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) + and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for + Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, 10112. VIPTO 51. Subj: Vice President’s Meeting with Prime Minister of Korea.The Vice President and the Prime Minister were in Saigon to attend inauguration ceremonies for the - newly elected Thieu-Ky government. Bundy - arranged the meeting at Porter’s request after being advised that Bonesteel had received - information indicating that the ROK - planned further actions against North Korea. Porter recommended that since - Humphrey “enjoys great prestige in Korea” he could caution the + newly elected Thieu-Ky government. Bundy arranged the meeting at Porter’s request after being + advised that Bonesteel + had received information indicating that the ROK planned further actions against North Korea. + Porter recommended that + since Humphrey “enjoys great prestige in Korea” he could caution the Koreans against such actions and demonstrate that the “matter has come to attention of highest levels of USG.” (Telegram 2119 from Seoul, October 27, and @@ -26666,8 +26686,8 @@ requests. The Vice President counseled patience and stated that he believed the matter could be worked out.The Korean press reported that “Humphrey had agreed in - principle that the US will provide two destroyers.” - Bundy labeled the statement a + principle that the US will provide two destroyers.” Bundy labeled the statement a “mischaracterization” that was “tantamount to an attempt to blackmail us” and one that could jeopardize Congressional reconsideration of the matter. (Telegram 64926 to Seoul, @@ -26862,14 +26882,14 @@ 27 KOR); and Part VII, “ROK Retaliation Against North Korea” (ibid., POL KOR N–KOR S). During - his visit Choe also met with Bundy on November - 13 and with McNamara on - November 16. Memoranda of those conversations are ibid., POL 7 KOR S, and Washington National Records Center, RG - 330,OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 2468, KOREA - 091.112, respectively. + his visit Choe also met with Bundy on November 13 and with McNamara on November 16. Memoranda + of those conversations are ibid., POL 7 KOR S, and + Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC + 72 A 2468, KOREA 091.112, respectively. Washington, Seoul, November 25, 1967, 0528Z. -

2576. For Secretary and Bundy from Ambassador. - Subject: Additional ROK Troop - Contribution to Vietnam.The contents of - this telegram were summarized in a November 28 memorandum from +

2576. For Secretary and Bundy from + Ambassador. Subject: Additional ROK + Troop Contribution to Vietnam.The contents + of this telegram were summarized in a November 28 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson as background to the Tuesday lunch meeting on that date. (ROK participation has long since been made and further participation will undoubtedly involve us in an exercise with rapidly diminishing returns.In his reply Bundy stated - that the United States still wanted “maximum additional ROK troop contribution,” while - avoiding “the ‘diminishing returns’ and ‘Aladdin’s Lamp’ - pitfalls” Porter - discussed. (Telegram 76010 to Seoul, November 29; ibid.) + xml:id="d134fn4">In his reply Bundy stated that the United States still wanted + “maximum additional ROK troop + contribution,” while avoiding “the ‘diminishing returns’ and + ‘Aladdin’s Lamp’ pitfalls” Porter discussed. (Telegram 76010 to Seoul, + November 29; ibid.) On balance, we still believe troops can be obtained and would be @@ -27345,8 +27366,8 @@ Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret. Also sent to Saigon and Tokyo. Drafted by - Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Meehan (Bundy; cleared by + Rostow, Meehan (S/S), and McNamara; and approved by Rusk. @@ -33062,8 +33083,8 @@ xml:id="d182fn1">Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Ambassadors’ Private Correspondence, 1967–1968. Secret. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Bundy to - Rusk, indicating - Bundy sent a copy to Rusk, indicating Bundy sent a copy to Katzenbach, Berger, Brown, and the Korea Country Director. @@ -33137,13 +33158,14 @@ while giving special attention to the type of hardware flowing into this country.In a March 4 memorandum transmitting this letter to Rusk, Bundy doubted the - United States could control such deliveries “to exert any - leverage on South Korean retaliatory impulses,” but added that - he would discuss the matter with the Department of Defense and - others. (Ibid.) In late March the Department of State considered - transferring ground ammunition worth as much as $100 million to - Korean forces, but Porter + >Rusk, Bundy doubted the United States could control + such deliveries “to exert any leverage on South Korean + retaliatory impulses,” but added that he would discuss the + matter with the Department of Defense and others. (Ibid.) In + late March the Department of State considered transferring + ground ammunition worth as much as $100 million to Korean + forces, but Porter opposed that action and advocated periodically supplying the Koreans with limited amounts of ammunition. (Telegram 138433 to Seoul, March 29, and telegram 5410 from Seoul, April 1; both in @@ -33976,9 +33998,9 @@ xml:id="pg_407"/> course to proceed with what has already been agreed and not entangle it with this more complicated new proposal.Paragraphs 1–10 were repeated in an undated - action memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, a copy of which was sent to - the Department of Defense, where Bundy + to Rusk, a copy of which was + sent to the Department of Defense, where Warnke forwarded it to Clifford with a covering memorandum indicating that he concurred with the recommendations contained therein. (Memorandum from Sharp)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 KOR S. Secret; Immediate; Specat. Repeated to the - Department of State for Bundy, which is the - source text. + Department of State for Bundy, which is the source text. Seoul, Seoul, May 2, 1968, 0700Z. -

6043. For Bundy from Ambassador.

+

6043. For Bundy from + Ambassador.

Two weeks after the Honolulu meeting of the two Presidents, it is @@ -36293,11 +36316,11 @@ November 8 and 9. The Korean Desk officers believed that the actions were perpetrated so that the North Koreans could “obtain the intelligence they need in mounting infiltrations by sea.” - (Memorandum from Leonard to Bundy, November 8, - attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, November 9; Johnson - Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. - VI) + (Memorandum from Leonard to Bundy, November 8, attached to a memorandum from + Rostow to the President, + November 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, + Korea, Memos, Vol. VI)

Coordinated Intrusions. Two North Korean infiltrators were sighted in the morning of November 1 near Sosan on the west coast of South Korea. Later @@ -36370,9 +36393,9 @@ raid “was a trial effort before carrying out large-scale guerrilla warfare against the ROK” following the pattern established by the Viet Cong of “trying to ‘liberate’ - villages one by one.” (Memorandum from Leonard to - Bundy, November 8, attached to a memorandum - from Rostow to President Bundy, November 8, attached to a + memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, November 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI) So far it appears that the east coast operation has met with complete @@ -37069,11 +37092,11 @@ Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Flash;Exdis. Also sent to Seoul and - repeated to Tokyo. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by - Brigadier General Steakley and in substance by Rusk and McNamara; and approved by Gendreau - (S/S-O). + repeated to Tokyo. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Brigadier General Steakley and in + substance by Rusk and + McNamara; and approved + by Gendreau (S/S-O). Washington, Nitze, Rostow, Rusk, Katzenbach, - Bundy, General Carroll, Hughes, and General - Carter. Rostow sent this - memorandum under a January 23 covering note to the President + corresp="#p_KNB1">Katzenbach, Bundy, General Carroll, Hughes, and + General Carter. Rostow sent + this memorandum under a January 23 covering note to the President indicating that it contained Helm’s “personal assessment.” Rostow’s note indicates that the President saw the memorandum. @@ -37480,8 +37503,8 @@ target="#t_POLAD1">POLAD and the White House. Drafted by Fleck and Berger; cleared by Steadman, Meeker, - Bundy, Steadman, Meeker, Bundy, Rostow, and Read; and approved by Rusk. @@ -44926,7 +44949,8 @@ >JohnsonSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR - N–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy. + N–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy. Washington, 342. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. I. Secret. @@ -55292,13 +55316,13 @@ William P. Bundy. (though doubtless too busy) or at least Bob Barnett to Seoul and Tokyo. Or how about cranking up Wilson Wyatt? - Bundy added three handwritten notations at the - bottom of this memorandum: “Anyone but WPB.” “I’d agree to Bob or Wyatt.” “Why not have Bob - sell WPB.” Wilson Wyatt was the - Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky and had served as the President’s - Special Emissary to the Government of Indonesia in 1963 to represent - the U.S. in negotiations on Indonesian oil. + Bundy added three handwritten + notations at the bottom of this memorandum: “Anyone but WPB.” “I’d agree to Bob or Wyatt.” “Why + not have Bob sell WPB.” Wilson Wyatt + was the Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky and had served as the + President’s Special Emissary to the Government of Indonesia in 1963 + to represent the U.S. in negotiations on Indonesian oil.

@@ -55569,7 +55593,7 @@ 346. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. II. Secret. @@ -55618,8 +55642,8 @@ target="#t_POL1">POL JAPAN–KOR S) I’ll keep the fires lit. - Bundy wrote “Good. MGB” at the bottom of this - memorandum. + Bundy wrote “Good. MGB” at + the bottom of this memorandum.

@@ -55719,26 +55743,26 @@ >Ball, Shiina and high ROKG figure (Yi Tong-won or someone else). Alternatively we could think in terms similar - meeting at time Asst. Secretary Bundy - will be in area. Whether meeting should be in Tokyo or Seoul - needs to be determined. Koreans would prefer Seoul, but if - Yoshida visit precedes, they may more readily accept Tokyo - meeting.Reischauer - expressed “grave doubts” about a tripartite meeting, - because its value in Korea depended on public knowledge - of the simultaneous visit by high-ranking U.S. and - Japanese officials. He indicated that such a meeting, - although assisting Korea, would have “seriously adverse - effects in Japan.” In Reischauer’s view it could not - occur without “creating impression US ‘intervening’ - directly in negotiations, which we still feel is most - unwise” and would give the Japanese leftists an issue to - exploit, thus significantly hindering the Japanese - Government from making “conciliatory moves toward - Koreans and complicating problem of ratification.” - Reischauer was not opposed to a visit by a U.S. - official, as long as it did not coincide with the Shiina - visit. (Ibid.) + meeting at time Asst. Secretary Bundy will be in area. Whether meeting + should be in Tokyo or Seoul needs to be determined. Koreans + would prefer Seoul, but if Yoshida visit precedes, they may + more readily accept Tokyo meeting.Reischauer expressed “grave doubts” + about a tripartite meeting, because its value in Korea + depended on public knowledge of the simultaneous visit + by high-ranking U.S. and Japanese officials. He + indicated that such a meeting, although assisting Korea, + would have “seriously adverse effects in Japan.” In + Reischauer’s view it could not occur without “creating + impression US ‘intervening’ directly in negotiations, + which we still feel is most unwise” and would give the + Japanese leftists an issue to exploit, thus + significantly hindering the Japanese Government from + making “conciliatory moves toward Koreans and + complicating problem of ratification.” Reischauer was + not opposed to a visit by a U.S. official, as long as it + did not coincide with the Shiina visit. (Ibid.) @@ -55778,7 +55802,7 @@ subtype="historical-document" type="document" xml:id="d348"> 348. Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (Reischauer) to the President’s Special - Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. II. Secret. A copy was sent to August 21, 1964.

Dear Mac:

In reply to your note of August 13,In his - letter to Reischauer Bundy underscored the - importance President Johnson - placed on realizing a settlement and normalization of relations - between Japan and Korea and the central role to be played by each - Embassy in achieving those objectives. (Ibid.) let me say - that the message on Korean normalization brought by Win Brown from the White House got through - to us loud and clear.

+ letter to Reischauer Bundy + underscored the importance President Johnson placed on realizing a settlement and + normalization of relations between Japan and Korea and the central + role to be played by each Embassy in achieving those objectives. + (Ibid.) let me say that the message on Korean normalization + brought by Win Brown from the + White House got through to us loud and clear.

Actually this problem has always stood at the top of my list of priorities. During a visit to Korea in the autumn of 1960, I became convinced that, without the economic boost that Korean-Japanese @@ -56027,8 +56051,8 @@ National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JAPAN–KOR S. Confidential; Official-Informal. The - letter indicates that Bundy saw it. A copy was - sent to Reischauer. + letter indicates that Bundy + saw it. A copy was sent to Reischauer. Seoul, William Bundy recommended to Rusk, who recommended to the President, that Pak make an official visit to - the United States in March or April. (Memorandum from - Bundy to Rusk; ibid.) Rusk repeated his recommendation memorandum to - the President in mid-January 1965 after the Korean press had - hinted that an invitation was in the offing. Although the White - House advocated delaying the visit until the outcome of - negotiations on the ROK-Japan + the United States in March or April. (Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk; ibid.) Rusk repeated his recommendation + memorandum to the President in mid-January 1965 after the Korean + press had hinted that an invitation was in the offing. Although + the White House advocated delaying the visit until the outcome + of negotiations on the ROK-Japan settlement became clearer, Rusk believed that in light of the media attention in Korea for the United States to withhold or delay @@ -56508,12 +56532,12 @@ terms they can get.” (Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson, undated, attached to a memorandum from - Bundy to Rusk, January 14, 1965; Department of State, - Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, - Miscellaneous Chronological File) Pak visited the United States - May 17–19, 1965; see Document - 363. + Bundy to Rusk, January 14, 1965; + Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D + 240, Miscellaneous Chronological File) Pak visited the United + States May 17–19, 1965; see Document + 363. @@ -56705,7 +56729,7 @@ 357. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Japan, Vol. III. No classification marking. @@ -56799,15 +56823,16 @@ settlement for some years. Delay itself was costly.

Foreign Minister Lee said that recently there had been very satisfactory developments, though the US might be of assistance in producing a - satisfactory and speedy result. Mr. Bundy had been - of great assistance during his visits to Korea and Japan last fall. - Ambassador Brown had also been - doing very effective work behind the scenes. The Basic Relations Treaty - concluded a few weeks ago dealt with the most fundamental and important - issues, which were now settled. A few minor issues, such as fisheries, - the status of Korean residents in Japan, and economic cooperation and - trade relations still remained. The Korean Government was negotiating - with Japan for a quick settlement of all these issues.

+ satisfactory and speedy result. Mr. Bundy had been of great assistance during his visits to + Korea and Japan last fall. Ambassador Brown had also been doing very effective work behind the + scenes. The Basic Relations Treaty concluded a few weeks ago dealt with + the most fundamental and important issues, which were now settled. A few + minor issues, such as fisheries, the status of Korean residents in + Japan, and economic cooperation and trade relations still remained. The + Korean Government was negotiating with Japan for a quick settlement of + all these issues.

The Foreign Minister said that he planned to stop in Tokyo for three days on his way back to Korea, when he would try to bring an end to the long-drawn-out negotiations and sign an agreement. He had told this to @@ -57032,32 +57057,34 @@ target="#t_POL1">POL JAPAN–KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Norred, cleared by Fearey and Barnett, and approved by - Bundy. Also sent to Tokyo and repeated to - CINCPAC for POLAD. + Bundy. Also sent to Tokyo + and repeated to CINCPAC for + POLAD. Washington, April 30, 1965, 9:35 a.m. -

1067. In meeting with Bundy today Ambassador Kim - quoted Korean Ambassador Tokyo Kim Tong-cho to effect that signing of - Korea-Japan settlement before Park visit was now almost impossible - physically because FonMin Lee and Agriculture Minister Ch’a had had to - waste three weeks in Assembly interpellations and there are four or five - holidays in Japan in late April and early May. - Bundy expressed surprise, saying very high - level Japanese officials had expressed hope for signing before Park - visit and their intention work to that end. Bundy - said it is “strong” desire of U.S. Govt that settlement be signed before - Park visit, and urged everything possible be done to that end. If it - were not signed, we would try to make Park visit a success, but it would - be far better if it were. Bundy added we have, and - will continue, to do all we can to impress upon Japanese need for early - signing. Kim said Park was still determined to sign before visit and - some others in Korean Govt thought this still possible. He said he would - report Bundy’s representations to his Govt.

+

1067. In meeting with Bundy today + Ambassador Kim quoted Korean Ambassador Tokyo Kim Tong-cho to effect + that signing of Korea-Japan settlement before Park visit was now almost + impossible physically because FonMin Lee and Agriculture Minister Ch’a + had had to waste three weeks in Assembly interpellations and there are + four or five holidays in Japan in late April and early May. Bundy expressed surprise, saying very + high level Japanese officials had expressed hope for signing before Park + visit and their intention work to that end. Bundy said it is “strong” desire of U.S. Govt that + settlement be signed before Park visit, and urged everything possible be + done to that end. If it were not signed, we would try to make Park visit + a success, but it would be far better if it were. Bundy added we have, and will continue, + to do all we can to impress upon Japanese need for early signing. Kim + said Park was still determined to sign before visit and some others in + Korean Govt thought this still possible. He said he would report + Bundy’s representations to + his Govt.

In immediately prior talks, Poats Rutherford M. Poats was Assistant Director for the Far East, Agency for International @@ -57459,8 +57486,8 @@ The Minister replied that the instruments of ratification were scheduled to be exchanged on December 22 in Seoul. He foresaw no - real problems arising. As he had mentioned to Mr. - Bundy that morning,Bundy that morning,A memorandum of their conversation is ibid. the negotiations were now over and the Korean people were trying to forget the sad memories of the past. @@ -57480,10 +57507,11 @@ since then. The Minister replied that he agreed and that his government, as - well as Mr. Bundy and Ambassador Brown, has made great efforts to - convince the Korean people of this truth. However, it is now up to - Japan to demonstrate sincerity in its dealings with Korea. + well as Mr. Bundy and + Ambassador Brown, has made + great efforts to convince the Korean people of this truth. However, + it is now up to Japan to demonstrate sincerity in its dealings with + Korea. The Secretary asked whether the Minister was suggesting that Japan adopt a “low posture” toward the Republic of Korea. The Minister